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Abstract 
In high technology industries firms use strategic learning alliances to create value that 
can’t be created alone. While they open their interorganizational membrane to gain 
new skills and competences, generate new products and services, accelerate develop-
ment speed, and enter into new markets their idiosyncratic knowledge base may be 
impaired when knowledge related dysfunctions like the unintended knowledge trans-
fer, asymmetric learning speed or premature closing occur. Within a value approach 
we examine the interplay of alliance coordination activities that enhance value crea-
tion, emerging knowledge related dysfunctions, and formal and organizational protec-
tions measures which shall safeguard firms intellectual crown jewels. We tested our 
hypotheses with a sample of 111 strategic alliances of young technology based Enter-
prises (YTBEs) with competing partners in high and key technology industries. Our 
findings suggest that a focal firm’s alliance management is well advised to intensely 
coordinate the alliance and to be aware of dysfunctional tendencies that erode alliance 
value. Since organizational protection measures could exaggerate dysfunctional effects 
they should be deployed very deliberately on a modest level. Formal protections 
measures, in contrast, seem to aggravate coordination activities’ value creation effect 
by setting behavioral guidelines. Moreover, an unsuccessful negotiation process of 
formal protection agreements may allow a deselection of partners that would not obey 
others intellectual property interests. Finally, we highlight theoretical and managerial 
implications that arise from these findings. Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    2 
1  Introduction 
In the last two decades strategic alliances have become a pivotal element of technol-
ogy firms’ competitive and innovation strategies (Contractor and Lorange 2002; Lavie 
2007). Cooperating firms intend to reduce and share costs and risks (Dyer and Singh 
1998), enhance their flexibility (Young-Ybarra et al., 1999), sharpen their competitive 
edge, enter new markets, and combine otherwise barely attainable resource endow-
ments or gain access to synergistic know how (Gulati, Nohira and Zaheer 2000; Dyer 
and Singh 1998).  The underlying motive of all these purposes is to achieve an above 
average value creation position that can’t be reached alone (Borys and Jemison 1989; 
Madhok and Tallman 1998; Dyer and Singh 1998). Yet expectations contrast with alli-
ances’ outcome. Researchers and practitioners report alliance failure and termination 
rates from 30-70 % (e.g. Kogut 1989; Park and Russo 1996; Dyer, Kale and Singh 
2001; Lunnan and Haugland 2008). Especially learning alliances entail a high risk 
since predominantly competitive partners may gain access to firms’ intellectual crown 
jewels in such arrangements (e.g. Hamel 1991; Larsson et al. 1998). Consequently, 
these relationships in many cases have resulted in value destruction for the companies 
that have engaged in them (Kale, Dyer and Singh 2001). On the other side it is known 
from a variety of perspectives that strategic alliances can be highly beneficial. 
Scholars have begun to examine the conditions under which value is created and ap-
propriated efficiently. Recent studies highlighted more and more alliance management 
concerns and identified the fulfillments of alliance coordination tasks as a key driver 
for collaborative value creation (e.g. Gulati and Singh ; Park and Ungson 2001; Reuer, 
Zollo and Singh 2002; White 2005). On the other side an ongoing discussion has ex-
tended Hamel’s (1991) argumentation on dysfunctional knowledge-related phenomena 
impairing value creation and appropriation in strategic learning alliances (Bresser 
1988; Khanna, Gulati and Nohria 1998; Larsson et al. 1998; Das and Rahman 2002; 
Inkpen and Currall 2004; Norman 2004). Knowledge-related dysfunctions, such as 
unintended knowledge transfer to the partner, asymmetrical learning and unidirectional 
informational closing, can change an alliance from a win-win into a win-lose or lose-
lose-arrangement. Practitioners try hard to avert these threats with formal and organ-
izational protection mechanisms. Knowledge protection is one of the key variables for 
a successful learning process (Inkpen 2002), but for this topic a systematic research is 
still lacking (Das and Rahman 2002) and, notwithstanding its theoretical and empirical Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    3 
import, empirical evidences have occurred only with limited extent. We want to close 
some of the gaps that have emerged by answering with our study these questions: 
Which effects do alliance coordination activities, knowledge-related dysfunctions and 
protection mechanisms have on the value of strategic alliances? How do the interac-
tions between alliance coordination activities, knowledge-related dysfunctions and 
protection mechanisms influence the value of the alliances? May protection measures 
moderate effects of knowledge-related dysfunctions? How do alliance coordination 
measures and protection measures interact? Do they interfere or complement? And do 
the effects vary for the different protection mechanisms? 
By addressing these issues concerning value creation, value appropriation, knowledge-
related dysfunctions and the protection of key knowledge in learning alliances this 
study augments prior research on strategic alliance management. We advance this re-
search through the theoretical distinction between formal and organizational protection 
as two significant mechanisms that firms implement to secure their idiosyncratic 
knowledge against unintended transfer and unauthorized use. Formal mechanisms base 
on property rights and contractual agreements that are established ex-ante within bidi-
rectional negotiations between alliance partners while organizational protection 
mechanisms are implemented clandestinely and unidirectional. We draw a differenti-
ated empirical picture of their interlinkages with alliance coordination measures and 
value eroding dysfunctional occurrences which underpins this delineation and extends 
the comprehension of the complex interdependencies within a system of alliance man-
agement activities. By doing this, our study especially contributes to the growing body 
of literature that advances a value orientated view of strategic alliances (e.g. 
Contractor and Lorange 1988a; Zajac and Olsen 1993; Dyer 1997;  Dyer, Singh and 
Kale 2008; Madhok 1997; Madhok and Tallman 1998; Anand and Khanna 2000; 
Sarkar, Echambadi and Harrison 2001; Kale, Dyer and Singh 2001; White and Siu-
Yun Lui 2005; Das and Kumar 2007; Lavie 2007;  Lavie 2009; Sarkar, Aulakh and 
Madhok 2009; Li, Zhou and Zajac 2009; Aggarwal and David H. Hsu 2009; Gulati, 
Lavie and Singh 2009). We discuss and analyze the above mentioned management 
instruments and the corresponding issues within a value framework. Further on, we 
adopt a performance measure that captures alliance success in value terms and inte-
grates both - disadvantageous as well as beneficial - aspects of the collaboration. 
Therewith we correspond to Barringer and Harrison’s (2000) request to assess alliance 
performance with a probabilistic rather than an economic assessment. In addition, this Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    4 
study extends alliance learning literature (e.g Lubatkin, Florin and Lane 2001; 
Simonin 1993; Simonin 1999a, 2004) and sets a counterpoint to the conventional view 
that predominantly highlights conditions fostering cooperative learning. We examine 
the influence of measures that should protect firm’s idiosyncratic knowledge and are 
per se expected to aggravate interorganizational learning. Moreover, this study may 
contribute to the emergent research stream on alliance management capability (e.g. 
Kale, Dyer and Singh 2002; Schreiner, Kale and Corsten 2009) since it shows that a 
value optimized implementation of protection measures is highly contingent on the 
anticipated collaborative situations. Then a firm’s ability to customize its protection 
activities to specific alliances may be interpreted and should be integrated as another 
constituent dimension of the higher-order construct alliance management capability. 
Eventually, our findings add to the increasing research on strategic alliances between 
competitors because our testing sample consists exclusively of such coopetitive ar-
rangements (Hamel 1991; Khanna, Gulati and Nohria 1998; Dussauge, Garrette and 
Mitchell 2000). 
In the following we firstly set the cornerstones for our analysis and describe a frame-
work of value creation and appropriation in strategic alliances. We examine the value 
effects of firms’ alliance management activities and knowledge-related dysfunctions 
on alliance success from the view of the focal firms. Firms’ task and relationship coor-
dination activities are essential elements of mutual value creation within the alliance 
arrangement. On the contrary, dysfunctional phenomena exacerbate value creation, let 
erode or misappropriate value that has been created, or finally destroy the alliance 
when it is the expression of an underlying opportunistic propensity of at least one part-
ner. Firms anticipate these potential developments and try prevalently to diminish its 
consequences with formal and organizational protection activities. The former prem-
ises on bidirectional contractual agreements and negotiational processes while the lat-
ter predominantly bases on unidirectional activities that should prevent unintended 
knowledge transfer across the interorganizational boundaries. Further on, we suppose 
that these variables affect alliance value not only directly but show intertwined and 
contingent effects and therefore we examine their interaction effects. We test our hy-
potheses in a dual key informant approach with a comprehensive sample of strategic 
alliances with competing partners of german young technology based firms (YTBE) in 
high and key technology industries.  Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    5 
2  Theory and hypothesis 
2.1  Value creation and capturing in strategic learning alliances 
The creation and sharing of value is the raison d’être of collaborative relationships 
(Anderson 1995) and many scientists have contributed to amend and sharpen the com-
prehension of value in cooperative arrangements. However, until today an explicit, 
monolithic and widespread accepted value concept is missing in strategic management 
research. Supplementary some confusion about the meaning and use of different value-
related terms is noted (Lepak, Smith and Taylor 2007; Priem 2007). Lepak et al. 
(2007) state a conceptual mix of value creation and value capture (e.g. Anderson 
1995), and a difficulty emerging from the ambiguous use of value creation as the con-
tent and the process of new value creation, which both may have its origins in the mul-
tidisciplinary nature of management research. Additionally some authors subsume ex-
clusively beneficial aspects which define value while a majority apprehends value as a 
difference or ratio of benefits and Costs respectively sacrifices accruing from business-
related and especially co-operational endeavours (Contractor and Lorange 1988a; 
Madhok and Tallman 1998).  
Nevertheless there is a broad accordance about the relevance of some distinct charac-
teristics of value, value creation and value appropriation in strategic alliance research: 
value which is created in and through strategic alliances normally is multifaceted and 
may be tangible or intangible; its valuation depends on subjective perceptions and is 
contingent (Ramirez 1999). Various value components reflecting the initial motives of 
knowledge-based interorganisational cooperation are of significance in learning alli-
ances and are aimed to directly or indirectly gain competitive advantage (Newbert 
2008). In technology-driven alliances new products, services (Kotabe and Swan 1995; 
Rothaermel and Deeds 2004) and instantaneously applicable knowledge and capabili-
ties (Harrigan 1985 ; Hamel 1991; Khanna 1998; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman 1996; 
Muthusamy and White 2005; Inkpen 1998, 2000, 2002, 2007) that evolved out of a 
resource and capability combining process of co-specialization (Mowery, Oxley and 
Silverman 2002; Doz and Hamel 1998) unfold their value increasing effects more 
manifestly and ocularly than the sharing of R&D-costs (Bayona, García-Marco and 
Huerta 2001) and risks (Contractor and Lorange 1988a; Contractor and Lorange 
1988b; Glaister and Buckley 1996), a decreased time-to-market (Schilling and Hill Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    6 
1998) and thereby a faster return on investment, the shaping of the competitive land-
scape (Glaister and Buckley 1996) or the cooptation of partners ties to otherwise un-
reachable buyers and suppliers (Contractor and Lorange 1988a; Starr and MacMillan 
1990). The total created value of the alliance is - on the outcome side as well as on the 
input side - regularly a mixture of miscellaneous tangible or intangible constituents. 
By way of example developing a technological product, e.g. active pharmaceutical 
ingredients, fuel cell components, software, etc., yields not only tangible benefits like 
patents, sales, profits, market shares and growth. Furthermore it may entail intangible 
benefits as new technological and managerial capabilities and skills (Kogut 1988; 
Parkhe 1991; Simonin 1997; Anand and Khanna 2000; Kale and Singh 2007), an en-
hanced access to network resources or the completion of a product line. Marketing 
(Zeithaml 1988) and management (Bowman and Ambrosini 2000) research have 
adapted the idea of value as a subjective concept originated in the Austrian schools of 
economics and sociology, in which the value of a resource emanates from, and de-
pends upon, individual preferences, demands and uses. Than money reflects the eco-
nomic value of an asset, resource or matter and allows the objectivation of the subjec-
tive values (Simmel 1900). These fundamental considerations suggest the differentia-
tion into use value referring to a special quality of a resource, product or service as 
perceived by users in relation to their needs, and exchange value (Smith 1776; Vargo 
and Lusch 2004, Lepak, Smith and Taylor 2007). Lepak et al. (2007) mention that the 
latter targets at the monetary amount which can be realized at a certain point in time 
for the delivering of either the use value or the new goods, services, products or re-
sources. However, Ramirez (1999) points out that value is rather contingent than sub-
jective. Teece and Sherry reveal some contingencies evidently for innovations (Teece 
1986) and intellectual property rights (Sherry and Teece 2004). They argue that the 
value of these knowledge-comprising resources can dramatically change over time due 
to technological or commercial reasons. Technologies and the related property rights 
may become obsolete or less valuable when a new substituting technology arises or 
markets increase when buyers alter their requirements or collapse in consequence of 
legislative amendments. Afuah (2000) shows that the value of an alliance diminishes 
when the partner’s technological capability renders obsolete and deteriorates the per-
formance of a focal firm.  
This attributes have impeded the assignment of value-based measures to ascertain the 
performance in and of interorganizational alliances. Some further aspects complicate Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    7 
the assessment of alliances’ value. Ohmae (1989) notes that the financials don’t cap-
ture the real data of an alliance, while Barringer et al. (2000) mention that the valua-
tion in monetary terms of intangible benefits like positive reputational effects, a broad-
ened social network or new skills may be nearly impossible. Doz et al. (1998) advert 
to the strategic character of learning alliances. Many of their ultimate consequences 
are enfolded in the long-term and thereby cannot be anticipated with precision.  
Nevertheless value-based performance measures have become decision criteria of ut-
most and increasing relevance for practitioners (e.g. Stanek 2004) and scientists to ap-
praise distinct alliances (Madhok and Tallman 1998), to compare or to select between 
alternative alliances (Madhok and Tallman 1998; Ulaga and Eggert 2006) and to man-
age alliances (e.g. Spekman et al. 1998; Ford and McDowell 1999; Revilla, Acosta 
and Sarkis 2005) and alliance portfolios (Lavie 2007; Ford and McDowell 1999  ; 
Sarkar, Aulakh and Madhok 2009;  Parise and Casher 2003).  
As we have adumbrated above, value shows different faces dependent on the assumed 
contingencies and views on and in an alliance. Our argumentation draws on the semi-
nal work of Madhok and Tallman (1998). They define value as the net rent earning 
capacity of tangible or intangible assets or resources. Understanding relationships as 
resources, they point out that such value of an alliance reflects with respect to cost-
effectiveness the partners’ ability to earn rents over and above what would be achiev-
able in alternative organizational arrangements. Enunciated in algebraic terms the 
value of a relation equals the difference of the relation-specific rents or benefits on the 
one and relation-specific costs, expenditures or sacrifices on the other side.  
We will also rely on Madhok and Tallmans (1998) crucial distinction between the po-
tential value and the realized value of a relationship. The potential value characterizes 
the theoretical synergistic potential of a relationship. It caps the maximal achievable 
value which can emerge from the optimal combination of complementary resources 
and capabilities in a specific organizational form. While this is an idealistic and more 
theoretical concept the realized value regards the realities and imperfectness of co-
operational arrangements and depicts the obtainable value within a managerial regime 
of an alliance. The realized value comprises collaborational slack arising on the firm 
level from incompatibilities, incomplementarities, safeguarding activities, and frictions 
occurring instance due to the change of strategies or the replacement of employees. 
Fading commitment originated in conflicts, misunderstanding and perceived uncer-Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    8 
tainty adds accessorily inefficiencies on the relationship level. Since the realized value 
marks the upper limit of the pie partners can share, it is worthwhile for them to under-
stand how to minimize the difference between the potential and the realized value 
through an adequate alliance management (e.g. Ariño and de la Torre 1998; Inkpen 
2007; Sampson 2005; Kale and Singh 2007) and the amelioration of their relational 
quality (Ariño, de la Torre and Ring 2001; Ariño, de la Torre and Ring 2005).  
Madhok and Tallman (1998) focus on the creation of value on an interorganizational 
level. For this reason we will add the terms appropriated value and captured value to 
firstly delineate between the creation and the capturing process, and secondly to ap-
prehend on the firm level the value which a focal company can attain as alliance out-
come. The retention of the benefits and the partitioning of alliance-specific costs and 
sacrifices define the value that a focal firm can appropriate when the mutually created 
value is distributed between alliance partners. The allocation is influenced by contrac-
tual agreements (Gulati and Singh 1998), made alliance-specific investments (Dyer 
1997; Dyer, Singh and Kale 2008;), power relations (Lavie 2009), factual interdepend-
encies (Khanna, Gulati and Nohria 1998; Dyer, Singh and Kale 2008), and the degree 
of fairness (Luo 2008), respectively opportunism (Parkhe 1993) established between 
alliance partners. 
Firms capture value when they sell the outcomes of the alliance and allocate exchange 
value (Priem 2007) or exploit the benefits they have maintained otherwise. Predomi-
nantly the benefits firms gain out of a learning alliance are not exploited mutually. 
Rather, they are combined and refined with firm-specific capabilities and resources to 
adapt offerings to special customer requirements and thereby to improve the exploit-
able value of use. In consequence, alliance management influence on the value cap-
tured fades out and is dominated by the impact of specific firm capabilities, skills and 
resources (Coff 2010; Makadok 2001; Newbert 2008). Hence we will focus on value 
creation and appropriation and neglect exploitation concerns. 
Alliance management has some setscrews to influence the size and the share of the pie 
that a focal firm can appropriate (Madhok and Tallman 1998). It can close the gap be-
tween the potential and the realizable value by improving the value creation process, 
and it may extend or abate the collaboration. Further, it can affect the allocation of the 
benefits gained and the costs shouldered by the partners. Unfortunately the influencing 
variables are intertwined and the change of a factor often induces not anticipated side Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    9 
effects. At instance saving some relation specific investments will not only lower a 
focal firm’s effort but reduce also the jointly realizable value of the alliance. In the 
following section we discuss the effects of certain alliance management instruments 
and activities on value creation and appropriation. 
2.2  Cooperative imperative vs. protection imperative 
The management in learning alliances addresses a major challenge. On the one side it 
has to establish interorganizational structures, processes, routines and personnel rela-
tionships to open the organization to the partner in order to enable and foster mutual 
value creation. On the other side it feels the need to protect its idiosyncratic resources 
against partner’s dysfunctional behavior and opportunistic propensity to reduce own 
sacrifices and especially minimize the unwillingly transferred knowledge. White et al. 
(2005) denote this antagonism (Ariño 2001; Das and Teng 2000; De Rond and Hamid 
2004) which alliance management research treats predominantly as two separated ap-
proaches, namely as the imperative to cooperate and the imperative to control. The 
cooperation imperative is theoretically entrenched in the resource based view and its 
derivatives. Conceptual arguments and empirical findings illumine the significance of 
the effective coordination of interdependent tasks (Kumar and Seth 1998; Gulati and 
Singh 1998), sharing of control and information, and overcoming interorganizational 
differences and managing conflicts (Mohr and Spekman 1994) for cooperative value 
creation. The reasoning of the control imperative has its fundaments in institution eco-
nomic deliberations. In the following, we examine the value concerns of the manage-
ment activities addressing these imperatives. We will discuss these topics within the 
value perspective and highlight the consequences on the perceived value from the 
viewpoint of an YTBE as a focal firm. Our argumentation will draw on five logical 
lines: 
We assume that the perceived alliance value is leveraged when on the alliance level (1) 
the potential value of the special alliance is extended. This happens, for instance, when 
partners broaden the collaborative scope (Khanna 1998). Additionally, partners can 
close the gap between the potential value and the realized value by an excellent alli-
ance management, which (2) enlarges the commonly created benefits or (3) reduces 
alliance related costs (Madhok and Tallman 1998). While these arguments focus on 
value creation, the following treat value appropriation. Assuming a distinct level of 
cooperatively created benefits, the perceived alliance value for the focal firm rises Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    10 
when the firm appropriates a relatively greater share of the pie (and vice versa). This 
situation occurs when in the wake of situational factors, alliance configuration, or 
management efforts the firm (4) reaps a larger proportion of the benefits or (5) bears a 
smaller amount of alliance costs as was ex-ante stipulated or expected. Since this ra-
tionality uses a quasi-linear arithmetic the reverse argumentation is also applicable.  
Additionally we adopt the perspective that alliance managers follow an optimization 
approach in their decision making (e.g. Zajac and Olsen 1993; Madhok 2000; Das and 
Rahman 2002; Bowman and Ambrosini 2007; Reuer and Ariño 2007). Zajac et al. 
(1993) delineate that following interorganizational strategies could induce significant 
transaction costs one the one side, but could be outweighed by the substantial value 
created by the partners on the other side. By way of example managers must weigh the 
value losses they would experience from dysfunctional incidents with the additional 
costs of negotiating safeguards into their alliance contracts ex-ante (Reuer and Ariño 
2007).  
2.3  Alliance coordination and alliance value 
Value creation in strategic learning alliances, where firms combine their specific skills, 
competencies and resources to gain mutual benefits, needs a least a minimum of coor-
dination (White 2005).  Sivadas et al. (2000) declare that “no alliance can succeed 
unless the partners can coordinate their activities competently”. Gulati et al. (1998) 
note, coordination considerations are extensive in alliances and rise with increasing 
degrees of interdependence, while Park et al. (2001) point out that strategic alliances 
require excessive effort to coordinate and integrate two independent organizations 
which could result in a high level of managerial complexity and uncertainty. Further 
on, an expanding use and complexity of integrative coordination mechanisms is docu-
mented when the degree of strategic interdependence between partner organizations 
has increased (Kumar and Seth 1998). Besides Reuer et al. (2002) argue, partners must 
develop coordination mechanism within as well as between activities when partners’ 
cooperative responsibilities are overlapping. Zollo et al. (2002) found support for the 
enhancing role of interfirm coordination and cooperation routines on collaborative 
agreements, and Kale et al. (2001) stress, that companies which invest in structures 
and systems to coordinate alliance activity reap benefit in a number of ways.  Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    11 
Following Sivadas et al. (2000), we comprehend coordination as the ”specification and 
execution of roles with minimal redundancy and verification and refers to the extent to 
which different ‘units’ function according to the requirements of other units and the 
overall system.” Causes for certain coordination activities than derive from two 
sources of interorganizational coordination needs (White and Siu-Yun Lui 2005). A 
primal research stream highlights the positive effects of rather task-driven coordination 
efforts on joint alliance success. Activities, mechanisms and routines of information 
sharing (Dyer 1997; Dyer and Singh 1998; Kumar and Nti 1998; Anderson and Narus 
1990), intensive and proactive communication (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Lee 2007; 
Young-Ybarra and Wiersema 1999; Kale, Dyer and Singh 2001; Sivadas and Dwyer 
2000; Sheng et al. 2006), managing conflicts (Kale, Singh and Perlmutter 2000) and 
finding compromises (Lin and Germain 1998), controlling the compliance of agree-
ments (Ancona and Caldwell 1992), the alignment of interests and actions of different 
departments and actors (Hughes and Weiss 2007; Ancona and Caldwell 1992) which 
are affected by the alliance internally and across the interorganisational boundaries 
(Ancona and Caldwell 1992), are found to stimulate and foster cooperative value crea-
tion.  
Other Authors place special emphasis on the stabilizing and value creating functions of 
social ties in alliance relationships. Ring et al. (1994) suppose that “personal relation-
ships increasingly supplement role relationships when alliances develop over time”, 
and reliance and trust, emerging out of personal relations, may compensate or substi-
tute formal contracts. Dyer (1997) accent, especially face-to-face-contact would lead 
to friendship and trust and thus reduce transaction costs. In learning alliances dialogue-
based face-to-face-communication provides managers a platform to improve their mu-
tual understanding of cooperative best practices to carry out alliance-related tasks at 
hand, and to share beneficial data and know-how (Kale and Singh 2007). Dyer et al. 
(2006) note that the quality of products is heightened through knowledge sharing in 
face-to-face-situation, while Cäker (2008) mentions, social coordination mechanisms 
would enhance alliance’ flexibility. Moreover, personal contact reduces behavioral 
uncertainty and is seen to be an antecedent of interorganizational trust since trust can 
only reside on an interpersonal level (Adobor 2006). Nevertheless, as Adobor (2006) 
delineates, interpersonal relations entail a dysfunctional potential. During alliance life 
time the loyalty to the firm of some individuals may decrease and, when cooperation is 
intense and interpersonal ties are strong, shift to co-workers on the partner’s side. Then Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    12 
information and know-how are eventually transferred which would, from the view-
point of a focal firm, better be protected and left undisclosed. The alliance is not 
longer led by firms’ interests but by personal self-interests (Park and Ungson 2001) 
and success gets tied to personal relationships (Anderson and Jap 2005). Poppo et al. 
(2008) state that overembedded social ties can be vulnerable to opportunism and effec-
tive adaptation, which lead to lower level of trust. By controlling social interactions 
and relations, a firm may be able to protect against such unwanted scenarios (Porter 
Liebeskind 1997). Consequently, Madhok (2000) claims that a relationship has to be 
actively managed in order to benefit from the premium attached by a better quality of 
the relationship and the pattern of interactions of cooperating partners. And appraising 
these management measures from the total alliance value perspective (Zajac and Olsen 
1993; Madhok and Tallman 1998; Madhok 2000; White and Siu-Yun Lui 2005 ) they, 
all in all, reduce the gap between the potential and the realized value, by extending the 
latter. 
The coordination activities discussed above, that are stimulating, enabling and enhanc-
ing value creation, are not for free (Porter 1990). Consequently, Gulati et al. (1998) 
put the spotlight on coordination costs as a management decision criterion in strategic 
alliances. As Park et al. (2001) reason, strategic alliances sometimes fail due to the 
excessive effort to coordinate independent organizations and integrate otherwise un-
connected tasks, and the resulting managerial complexity and uncertainty. The effort 
to coordinate depends on the specific structural and processual configuration of the 
collaboration as well as on the concrete task which has to be performed (Kumar and 
Dissel 1996). Coordination costs rise with the anticipated interdependence of alliance 
partners (Gulati and Singh 1998), asset specificity and environmental uncertainty (Artz 
and Brush 2000), the complexity of information processes (Park and Ungson 2001; 
White and Siu-Yun Lui 2005), the number and heterogeneity of involved firms 
(Okamuro 2007), and the size of the partner interfaces (White and Siu-Yun Lui 2001). 
These factors alleviate the realizable value of the alliance, but on the other side, alli-
ance logic implies that partners create substantial value, which should outweigh alli-
ance costs (Zajac and Olsen 1993; Park and Ungson 2001). Management normally will 
strive a level of coordination activities made to fulfil cooperative task with respect to 
the optimization of anticipated profits, or at least, as Park et al. (2001) formulate, “the 
gains from specialization override the costs of coordination”. Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    13 
Hypotheses 1: There is a positive relationship between alliance coordination 
and the perceived alliance value for the focal firm.  
2.4  Knowledge related dysfunctions and alliance value 
Learning is one, if not the key function in YTBEs strategic alliances. This is docu-
mented in widespread literature streams on interorganizational learning (e.g. Lane and 
Lubatkin 1998; Kumar and Nti 1998; Larsson et al. 1998; Lubatkin, Florin and Lane 
2001; Kale and Singh 2007), R&D-cooperation (e.g. Brockhoff 1992; Oxley and 
Sampson 2004; Sampson 2004; Faems et al. 2006; Sampson 2007), new product de-
velopment (e.g. Kotabe and Swan 1995; Deeds and Hill 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds 
2004; Gerwin and Ferris 2004; Kalaignanam, Shankar and Varadarajan 2007), and 
knowledge transfer (e.g. Simonin 1993; Simonin 1999a; Mowery, Oxley and 
Silverman 1996; Muthusamy and White 2005; Inkpen 2007). Learning with partners in 
alliances promises the share of R&D costs and risks and the reduction of uncertainty, 
the access to complementary resources and skills, the shortening of development 
times, the improvement of the own resource and competence base, as well as the effi-
cient deploy of extant resources and the capture of knowledge spillovers (Caloghirou, 
Hondroyiannis and Vonortas 2003). Moreover, cooperative learning can have an indi-
rect impetus and amend the access to markets, increase market power or facilitate the 
establishment of technical standards (Caloghirou, Hondroyiannis and Vonortas 2003).  
But where is much light, there is a strong shadow. Severe hazards lurk as quasi-
antipodes to these potential benefits. A major concern that YTBEs face in strategic 
learning alliances is the threat of their unique knowledge and technology positions. 
Researchers explicated asymmetric learning pace (Hamel 1991; Khanna, Gulati and 
Nohria 1998), the unwanted transfer of knowledge, skills and competencies (Bresser 
1988; Hamel 1991), and the premature closing of the cooperation (Khanna, Gulati and 
Nohria 1998) as three learning and knowledge related dysfunctional syndromes, which 
have tremendous impact on alliance success for a focal firm.  
These dysfunctions have attracted researchers’ interest. Especially transaction cost 
theory based argumentations assume opportunistic propensity and behavior as the vital 
cause of knowledge related dysfunctions. However, opportunism, defined by William-
son (1975) as “self-interest seeking with guile”, is a fragment of but not the whole 
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vant but not all the essential facets. The notion of guile, described by Williamson 
(1985) as "lying, stealing, cheating, and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, 
obfuscate, or otherwise confuse", separates opportunism from the standard economic 
assumption of self-interest-seeking behavior (Wathne and Heide 2000). Though 
knowledge related dysfunctions do not necessarily need an actor’s intent to shirk or 
cheat. They often result from incomplete information, information asymmetries, mis-
judgment or misunderstanding, that are owed to dynamic situations, turbulent envi-
ronments and complex decision making processes which are typical conditions for 
strategic alliance in high technology industries.  
Since the conceptual delineation of one partner’s intended and unintended accepting 
advantage has not been stated clearly (Wathne and Heide 2000), we adapt the term 
dysfunctions from system theory (Merton 1968) which covers both, situations where 
the dysfunction is part of an aggressive and opportunistic partner strategy as well as 
situations where these misdirecting phenomena appear unintended. Dysfunctions occur 
either in a combined or in an isolated and pure form. When they appear intertwined, 
they augment their destructive force and affect the cooperation pertaining to stability, 
outcome and allocation of benefits and costs.   
Asymmetric learning speed: The difference in learning capability and strategic intent 
for learning between the partners is one of the key process variables in managing an 
alliance (Lane and Lubatkin 1998; Park and Ungson 2001). Asymmetric learning is 
often established by the time cooperation is initiated since during the negotiation phase 
future partner lack information about each others absorptive capacity, learning skills 
and intents and hence misvalue or misjudge their interorganizational fit. When coop-
eration endures for a longer time then often differences spread as partners strive for 
changed individual strategies (Hennart, Roehl and Zietlow 1999; Zeng and Hennart 
2002), lose or gain key persons, or the technological capabilities of a partner become 
obsolete due to technological development (Afuah 2000). Firms that force a race to 
learn additionally try to aggrandize their learning advantages to ameliorate their rela-
tive value appropriation position. However, asymmetric learning and the subsequent 
asymmetric dependence derogates alliance stability and affects the distribution of alli-
ance costs and benefits (Hamel 1991; Inkpen and Beamish 1997; Khanna, Gulati and 
Nohria 1998; Park and Ungson 2001). Khanna et al. (1998) stress that a faster learning 
party can appropriate a higher share of the cooperatively created value when it acts 
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veal more and more of its proprietary knowledge to hold its attractiveness (Hamel 
1991; Park and Ungson 2001). If learning differences exceed beyond a critical level 
partner tend to renegotiate the allocation of expenditures and benefits (Ariño and de la 
Torre 1998). This comprises the potential for escalating conflicts and destabilizes the 
cooperation (Kumar and Nti 1998). Das et al. (2002) and Inkpen et al. (2004) mention, 
the disadvantaged partner could react opportunistically when it feels controlled or 
dominated. Park et al. (2001) point out the disadvantaged partner may leave the alli-
ance, not only because he is more vulnerable to actions taken by the dominant partner, 
but its survival may depend on overall alliance outcome. But even when the alliance 
stays stable costs of bargaining (Williamson 1991) and conflict solution lower the real-
izable value of the alliance. Further on, relative to a symmetric learning situation, in 
particular in a learning race, a focal firm gains fewer benefits and carries higher ex-
penditures when it is the laggard partner.  
Loss of knowledge: Acquiring and internalizing knowledge, competencies and skills 
are key issues in learning alliances (Hamel 1991). Therefore firms open their bounda-
ries and give each other partial access to proprietary, often tacit and otherwise not 
available knowledge (Inkpen 1998; Inkpen and Dinur 1998). As long as this process is 
bidirectional, reciprocal, and accepted, mutual value creation is invigorated and both 
partners enhance their individual knowledge bases (Dutta and Weiss 1997). Yet the 
unilateral transfer of knowledge frequently exceeds an agreed-upon-level and is then 
conceived as a loss. Different causes can precipitate this loss. The disclosure may be 
induced by the negligence of the transferring firm’s staff. This is mainly uncritical. But 
when the acquiring party is alleged to follow a hidden agenda and behave opportunis-
tic severe consequences can occur. As Gulati et al. (1998) emphasize, the concerns 
about free-riding and possible appropriation of key technology can be provoked and 
exacerbated by the difficulties to “circumscribe, bound, monitor, and codify the 
knowledge to be included within the alliance”. The case of opportunistic knowledge 
appropriation of actual and potential competitors is widely discussed in alliance litera-
ture (e.g. Hamel 1991; Larsson et al. 1998; Khanna, Gulati and Nohria 1998) and 
feared by practitioners. Grievous conflicts (e.g. Park and Ungson 2001), eroding in-
centives to cooperate (Ariño 2001) and the dissolution of the alliance are observed 
(Hamel 1991).  
From the view of a focal firm the loss of knowledge has implications pertaining to the 
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the focal firm could have demanded a consideration for the transferred knowledge. 
Secondly, the loss lowers the firm’s attractiveness for the partner, so it has to increase 
its own efforts to stay in the race. Thirdly, when the loss is suspected to be the out-
come of opportunistic partner activities, mistrust appears and the potential as well as 
the realized value will be cut if the focal firm reduces alliances scope or dissolves the 
cooperation. Fourthly, the resolution and reconciliation of resulting conflicts needs 
time and management capacities. Both are bound to costs. Fifthly, when the partner is 
or wants to become a competitor he presumably uses the knowledge to contest the fo-
cal firm’s competitive position in their common target markets (Hamel 1991). A loss 
of market shares and reduced prices in consequence of increased competition will 
lower the firms’ profit. 
Informational Closing: Uni- or bidirectional withholding of information and data 
(John 1984; Deeds and Hill 1999) is a major complicacy in learning alliances and of-
ten causes or signals the dawn of cooperation’s dissolution. But even when the alliance 
remains stable the informational closing reduces the joint learning (Larsson et al. 
1998) and induces conflicts and frustration (Jordan and Lowe 2004). Informational 
closing has different origins. Some authors emphasize that some firms use the closure 
of information as part of their alliance strategy. Williamson (1985) claims that incom-
plete disclosure of information would refer to opportunism. Hamel  (1991) describes 
Japanese firm’s efforts to plan the amount of information flowing across the collabora-
tive membrane to leave European or American partners in a worse strategic position. 
Khanna et al. (1998) highlight another competitive aspect. They point out, that a firm 
which finishes learning sooner than the partner is free to leave the alliance and to deny 
partners access to its knowledge. Thereby the faster firm can gain greater benefits and 
defray lower costs (Alvarez and Barney 2001). Hughes et al. (2007) refer partner 
would withhold information such as significant testing data in order to conceal evi-
dences of their incompetence or poor performance. Hennart (1988) invokes that the 
ex-ante-appraising of tacit knowledge is problematic; a partner whose expectations are 
dashed may revaluate its contributions and then exploit contract incompleteness and in 
turn withhold own knowledge (Ariño and Doz 2000). Other authors mention causes of 
informational closing which forbear from intended or opportunistic behavior. Singh et 
al. (1996) mention that organizations shut down sometimes due to economical failure. 
Hennart et al. (1999) report the change of ownership or alliance key persons could 
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strategies, while Gerwin et al. (2002) cover that in an multinational alliance intercul-
tural misunderstanding led to the withdrawal of alliance members, and the withholding 
of information and ideas. Anderson et al. (2005) allude that the misinterpretation of 
harmless partners activities can lead to mistrust and, consequently, informational clos-
ing in order to protect the firm against the supposed opportunistic behavior of the part-
ner. Thereby a spiral of suspicion could be ushered which annihilates the alliance. 
No matter if intended or not, informational closing has implications for the creation 
and allocation of alliance value. On the alliance level, the shortening of the disposable 
knowledge, information and data aggravates and constrains the joint learning (Larsson 
et al. 1998), and hence reduces the total realizable value and the shareable benefits. 
Additional effects occur on the firm’s level. When the closure is a brick of an outlearn-
ing strategy the effects mentioned above will ensue. Otherwise the focal firm faces 
accessory costs either because it reaches out for its individual goals alone (Singh and 
Mitchell 1996), or raises its coordination efforts to avoid alliance severance, resolute 
potential conflicts and improve mutual understanding (Ariño and Doz 2000). 
Hypotheses 2: There is a negative relationship between knowledge-related dys-
functions and the perceived alliance value for the focal firm. 
2.5  Protection of idiosyncratic knowledge 
2.5.1  Formal and organizational protection 
The knowledge-related hazards we have highlighted in the preceding section arise 
from the specific characteristic of valuable knowledge and the paradox situation in 
learning alliances (Jordan 2004). Since knowledge creation is costly and can be shared 
without losing its value-in-use firms perforate their organizational boundaries to com-
bine their knowledge with an alliance partner and gain otherwise unattainable abnor-
mal rents. Simultaneously they fear the uncontrolled diffusion of their idiosyncratic 
knowledge, competencies and skills through the interorganizational membrane (e.g. 
Hamel 1991; Baughn and Stevens 1997; Heiman and Jack A. Nickerson 2004). Espe-
cially when the partner is an actual or potential competitor who could use the so ac-
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need to avoid an imbalanced knowledge transfer and protect their intellectual assets 
against an involuntary access (Hamel 1991; Baughn and Stevens 1997). 
This imperative to control and protect is broached in studies from different theoretical 
perspectives. Authors who argue from a transaction cost background emphasize the 
deterrence of partner’s opportunistic behavior. They predominantly discuss the general 
efficacy of non-recoverable investments (e.g. Parkhe 1993), contractual safeguards 
(e.g. Deeds and Hill 1999; Lui and Ngo 2004), equity-swaps (e.g. Mitchell, Dussauge 
and Garrette 2002), and governance structures (e.g. Oxley 1997) in suppressing and 
curtailing opportunistic incidents. Other studies draw on social exchange theoretical 
arguments and stress the supremacy of self-enforcing safeguards like relational norms, 
trust or commitment (e.g. Kale, Singh and Perlmutter 2000). Some researchers strive 
to compare and combine these approaches (e.g. Dyer 1997; Achrol and Gundlach 
1999). Resource based theorists, on the contrary, don’t assign the assumption of op-
portunism a decisive role. Instead, they point at irreducible knowledge differences be-
tween individuals and organizations (e.g. Conner and Prahalad 1996).  
However, while opportunistic behavior in an alliance context is widely examined, the 
protection of valuable knowledge against loss and unbalanced transfer has received 
limited empirical research despite its theoretical and practical import (Norman 2002; 
McEvily, Eisenhardt and Prescott 2004) and lacks a systematic approach (Das and 
Rahman 2002). Beside grounded theory development (Hamel 1991), analysis using 
interview data (Porter Liebeskind 1997; Baughn and Stevens 1997; Norman 2001) and 
some case studies (Roehl and Truitt 1987; Yoshino and Rangan 1995; Galvin and Rice 
2008) only few quantitative studies provide empirically founded insights which ad-
dress the interlinkages of knowledge protection and alliance outcome (Norman 2004; 
Lee et al. 2007; Nielsen 2007). Nielsen (2007) found, that while the building of relati-
onal equity, financial success and learning was negatively affected by partners’ protec-
tiveness, the efficiency of the cooperation was not influenced. In addition Nielsen et 
al. (2009) gave evidence that knowledge protectiveness is negatively related to trust 
learning and innovation in international strategic alliances. In contrary, Lee et al. 
(2007) state that knowledge protection fosters relational quality and knowledge ambi-
guity and thereby indirectly alliance performance, and Norman (2004) showed that the 
focal firm’s knowledge loss increased with its knowledge protection efforts. These 
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Firms use a mixture of different protection mechanisms to secure their knowledge in 
interorganizational learning arrangements. In an ex-ante literature and field research 
we have identified formal protection mechanisms and  organizational protection 
mechanisms as the two categories of mechanisms which alliance management uses 
predominantly. Formal protection mechanisms rely on legalistic norms and contractual 
agreements and set the boundaries between partners’ different specific intellectual 
property rights positions. Organizational protection mechanisms are used to configure 
and adjust the compound of structures, processes, rules and management decisions 
allowing the transfer of knowledge across organizational boundaries which Hamel 
(1991) calls the interorganizational membrane. We will focus on these mechanisms 
since the protection function lies on the core of both of these sets. Other measures like 
the above mentioned exchange of equity shares or the development of relational qual-
ity address primarily different aims and evolve their protective weight only as a side-
effect. By doing this, we revert to Norman’s (2001) overview and adapt her distinction 
of protection mechanisms. 
Formal protection mechanisms: The formal protection of firms’ knowledge in learning 
alliances bases on the two pillars of ensured intellectual property rights (IPR) which 
are entitled within national IPR-regimes and contractual agreements between the part-
ners. Hertzfeld et al. (2006) note that patents are the most frequently used intellectual 
property protection mechanisms in research partnerships and protect both background 
as well as foreground knowledge. With reference to the protective relevance they are 
followed by trade secrets, copyrights and trademarks. Baughn et al. (1997) state that 
the registration of IPRs sends a clear signal to partners regarding proprietary intent, 
but, as Jordan et al. (2004) mention, patents would be a necessary but not sufficient 
means of protecting core knowledge. Moreover, only a fraction of a firm’s valuable 
knowledge is protectable through IPRs (Porter Liebeskind 1996). We suppose that this 
is one reason why partner employ legal contracts in which they can codify their spe-
cific protection needs and agreements. Norman (2001) refers that alliance partner spec-
ify proprietary information, data and knowledge to sketch the ex-post ownership struc-
ture, and detail which information and capabilities should and which should not be 
shared within their cooperative arrangement. This delineation is not only a signal to 
the partner that opportunistic knowledge acquisition would result in a lawsuit (Hannah 
2005). It serves also as an intrafirm-guideline for members who are concerned with the 
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as commonly used contracts to obligate partners to not disclose shared intellectual 
property to third parties. The required confidentiality is an essential brick in securing 
legal protection for trade secrets. Zander et al. (1995) have shown that the turnover of 
key employees by competitors significantly reduces their imitation times. Especially 
competitive partners establish non-enticement clauses to counteract the temptation of 
hiring away employees who have incorporated tacit knowledge (Porter Liebeskind 
1996; Porter Liebeskind 1997), and auxiliary penalty or compensation clauses are 
stipulated for the case that problematic intellectual property practices occur and are 
detected (Teng 2007; Norman 2001). 
Legalistic mechanisms aim at the ability to behave opportunistic behavior (Madhok 
2000;  Das and Rahman 2002) and the obviation of misunderstandings that occur in 
volatile and dynamic settings (Carson, Madhok and Wu 2006). When the potentially 
cooperating firms aren’t well acquainted they may stretch a quasi-safety-net which lets 
competitive parties dare to open to each other and develop a willingness to cooperate. 
Further on, they serve as guidelines during the operation stage which allow to distinct 
between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. 
Organizational protection mechanisms: Organizational protection mechanisms are 
employed when legalistic protection mechanisms don’t suffice. Typically a consider-
able body of knowledge that is valuable to a firm cannot be legally protected be pat-
ents, trade secrets, copyrights or other IPRs (Porter Liebeskind 1997). Therefore part-
ners in interorganizational learning arrangements, where the exchange of not codifi-
able, tacit, complex and specific knowledge is essential or meaningful, apply a wide 
variety of active measures to limit and adjust their transparency (Hamel 1991). In such 
scenarios a rival firm can only acquire tacit knowledge through learning-by-doing and 
therefore quite extensive interactions have to take place between a rival partner’s em-
ployees and those of the target firm (Porter Liebeskind 1997). Hamel (1991) describes 
that firms which tend to override prohibitive safeguards disperse their offensive infor-
mation requests on different and independent target individuals, to gain a holistic un-
derstanding and to stay undetected. To prevent these creeping leakage of valuable 
knowledge Porter Liebeskind (1997) suggests to establish rules governing the social 
interaction between different cooperating actors and to prohibit certain contacts. And 
Norman (2001) argues, that the fulfillment of protecting management tasks as well as 
processes, structures and rules that allow for the exclusion of certain information and 
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closed. Normally, the effective knowledge exchange is determined some levels below 
where the deal was signed by day-to-day interactions of engineers, marketers, and 
product developers (Hamel, Doz and Prahalad 1989). In such cases top management 
has to ensure that knowledge protection concerns are considered at these hot spots. 
Hamel (1991) describes an alliance where as a countermeasure all partner requests 
for information and access were processed through a small collaboration department, 
and (Norman 2001) reports the limitation of information flows across firm boundaries 
on few actors like gatekeeper or communication stars. Baughn et al. (1997) suggests to 
brief interface personnel in what skills can and cannot be shared and exemplify to 
them the strategic costs and benefits of collaboration. Maurer et al. (2000) notice, that 
physical protection is an antecedent to attain legally protection of trade secrets, since 
courts would require reasonable and active steps to protect them. Therefore some au-
thors suggest to wall-off relevant activities and deny partners access to distinct facili-
ties and non-alliance personal (Porter Liebeskind 1997; Norman 2001).  
The implementation of these countermeasures requires top-management decisions and 
support (Norman 2001). Senior managers have to identify the knowledge, competen-
cies and skills which must be protected. Then they have to raise individuals’ awareness 
of protective needs on the operational stage, where the exchange, transfer and leakage 
of relevant knowledge occur, and determine the modalities of protection procedures. 
Further on, the alliance management has to provide the needed resources and to place 
safeguarding responsibilities on dedicated members of the staff (Norman 2001). Even-
tually, the accomplishment of the assigned measures, the compliance of the specified 
rules and the adequate behavior of firm and partner employees have to be monitored 
(Das and Rahman 2001; Das and Rahman 2002).  
2.5.2  Effects of protection measures on the alliance value 
Within the value framework protection mechanisms have to be appraised by their ef-
fects on value creation and appropriation dynamics. Protection mechanisms function 
as collaborative antecedents within a strategic alliance (Lee et al. 2007) since they al-
low companies to open their doors ajar for their partners and to control the spill over of 
their specific knowledge while they must not fear the complete loss of their intellectual 
assets. They enable interorganizational value creation but don’t work as value creation 
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be formulated, value shrinkage (Das and Rahman 2002) which is induced by protec-
tive efforts is documented. Some authors argue that protection measures would lower 
the ability to learn since they increase the ambiguity (Coff, Coff and Eastvold 2006; 
van Wijk, Jansen and Lyles 2008) and thereby the transferability (Simonin 2004; Lee 
et al. 2007) of knowledge. Moreover, the structural isolation and contractual exclusion 
of relevant knowledge reduce the disposable knowledge and constrain the realizable 
value (Porter Liebeskind 1997). Norman (2004) points out that partners often respond 
to each other’s limiting of information sharing by further reducing their own  sharing, 
and Simonin (1999b) states extreme protectiveness likely leads to irreparable conflicts 
between partners and the early termination of the alliance. Other authors mention that 
operational protection mechanisms reduce partners’ flexibility (Salbu 1997), decrease 
the quality of intra- and interfirm interactions (Madhok 2000), hinder the trust building 
process (Das and Rahman 2002), may be burdensome, since they have to be deployed 
on an ongoing and periodic basis (Das and Rahman 2002), and can reduce the mental 
and emotional willingness and capability to cooperate ((Porter Liebeskind, 1997)). 
These benefit-related-effects reflect only one side of the coin. In addition the appliance 
of protection measures induces direct and indirect costs that can absorb much of the 
expected benefit from the alliance (Parkhe 1993). The setting and maintaining of for-
mal and organizational protection increases transaction costs because managers ex-
pend greater time and effort to bargain (Ariño and Reuer 2004; Reuer and Ariño 
2007), monitor (Porter Liebeskind 1997) and enforce the cooperative arrangement 
(White and Siu-Yun Lui 2005). Additional coordination costs arise when the design of 
information access and flows focuses more on protection issues than on task fulfill-
ment. Especially when people can not meat face-to-face, must communicate via gate-
keeping instances, or have to undergo extensive approval routines, coordination activi-
ties become more difficult, and the likelihood of informational slack, delays and inef-
ficient outcomes increases (Porter Liebeskind 1997). Moreover, Norman (2004) found 
that a firm’s knowledge protection efforts based on restrictive rules for information 
access and communication behavior increases the focal firm’s knowledge loss. Thus 
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Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between formal protection and 
the perceived alliance value. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between organizational protec-
tion and the perceived alliance value. 
2.6  Interactions of alliance coordination, dysfunctions and protection mecha-
nisms 
2.6.1  Moderating effect of formal protection on alliance coordination 
The functional and developmental differences between the formal and organizational 
protection mechanisms sketched above result into divergent joint effects with occur-
ring dysfunctional phenomena and coordination activities. The ex-ante identification 
and solving of problems and the forming of relational behavior during the negation of 
formal protection mechanisms affect the coordination activities bifurcately. Firstly, if 
partners have mitigated or solved potential breaking points beforehand and feel save to 
maintain their knowledge, they can concentrate on the essence of their alliance (Das 
and Rahman 2002). Coordination activities may then be focused and adjusted on the 
fulfillment of tasks and interorganizational learning which leverages their coordinative 
force. Ex-ante-problem-solving also reduces conflicts in terms of frequency and inten-
sity and diminishes the friction losses which accompany disputes and dissensions. 
When protection mechanisms avoid the occurrence of conflicts partners generally can 
accelerate their processes, increase the detoration of coordination instruments, reduce 
the staffs frustration and raise cooperative behavior (Das and Rahman 2002). The bar-
gaining costs for the formal protection agreements can be overcompensated by the 
emerging positive value creating effects and the saving of the otherwise needed re-
sources to manage conflicts and limit their destructing momentum (Ariño and Reuer 
2004). Secondly, as partners agree on formal protection mechanisms they reduce in-
formation asymmetry, develop mutual understanding, meliorate their appreciation and 
enhance relational quality (Poppo and Zenger 2002; Ariño and Reuer 2004; Larsson et 
al. 1998). Potentially mistakable action than do not cause conflict spirals since allies 
trust each other, presume reciprocal fairness and have heightened their perception 
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firms coordination activities can fully enfold their value creating force without spuri-
ously being misinterpreted as pure self interest seeking. Thus: 
Hypotheses 5:  The positive relationship between coordination activities and 
the perceived alliance value will be stronger when formal protection is more in-
tensive. 
2.6.2  Moderating effect of organizational protection on alliance coordination 
Coordination and organizational protection activities have to be simultaneously ac-
complished during alliance lifetime to run the cooperative process and effectively pro-
tect essential intellectual property against loss. The in-situ-coordination-effects of or-
ganizational protection mechanisms, which are intended to shield certain knowledge, 
sometimes collide with those of the coordination instruments that aim on the creation 
of joint value. We want to highlight three mechanisms that let erode coordination in-
struments effects: Firstly, a firm that communicates with its partner only via few gate-
keeping persons may exactly allot the transfer of disclosable knowledge, but at the 
same time will have to deal with the communicational slack, namely information 
losses and distortions as well as time-lags, that this structure causes (Porter Liebeskind 
1997). The partner may misconstrue these symptoms either as signals of the firm’s 
incapability, unwillingness to collaborate or opportunistic propensity and reduce its 
alacrity to cooperate or counteract with increased self interest seeking. A focal firm’s 
coordination power then will at least dissipate partially. Secondly, the design of com-
munication structures and flows is often more oriented at protection than at coordina-
tion objectives. However, since they are less adapted to for coordination issues, the 
protective in-situ-coordination dilutes task coordination activities to some extent 
(Carson, Madhok and Wu 2006). Thirdly, a partner perceives to be mistrusted and 
fears to be overreached when he detects that relevant and necessary knowledge and 
staff is unspokenly walled-off through rules, routines or physical isolation (Das and 
Rahman 2002). As a countermeasure he will reduce his relational openness and close 
the informational membrane on his part (Norman 2004; Larsson  et  al., 1998). Since 
the partner’s acceptance to cooperate is decreased and the available knowledge base 
for learning and joint value creation is contracted (Porter Liebeskind 1997) the focal 
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Hypotheses 6:  The positive relationship between coordination activities and 
the perceived alliance value will be weaker when organizational protection is 
more intensive.  
2.6.3  Moderating effect of formal protection on knowledge-related dysfunctions 
Partners in learning alliances will sooner or later face some symptoms of knowledge-
related dysfunctions. In collaborative arrangements that are embedded in dynamic and 
technologically challenging environments preventing mechanisms can’t foreclose all 
eventualities. The costs of completely comprehensive knowledge protection – if not 
impossible by definition – would probably exceed the expected returns of the alliance 
(Das and Rahman 2002). Further on, the flexibility and openness partners need to cre-
ate value in such uncertain and ambiguous situations would be undermined. But the 
agreed-on formal protection agreements offer different bearing points to curtail dys-
functions negative influence on the creation and appropriation of value. Carson et al. 
(2006) explicate that parties which ex-ante have gone through an extensive negotiation 
process are better disposed to interpret their environment and partners behavior ex-
post. Formal protection agreements facilitate discerning between acceptable and not-
acceptable behavior and interpreting it as intended or not-intended. A correct appraisal 
of the specific situation contingent to the severeness, intendedness and continuance of 
the dysfunctional incidents enables the parties to react appropriately on the emerging 
conflicting issues. Subsequently the formally fixed agreements provide a frame for 
discussions and solutions of potential conflicts (Gulati, Khanna and Nohria 1994). 
Their construction can resolve misunderstandings and ease the occurring tensions be-
tween the partners. The de-escalation of the conflicted situation stabilizes or even 
augments the collaborative relationship and allows continuing mutual value creation. 
In cases of weighty knowledge loss or opportunistic behavior formal protection 
agreements may help partners to find an amicable and extrajudicial consent. They can 
renegotiate the distribution of the mutually created value in the light of the dysfunc-
tional incidents and compensate for the transferred intellectual property and thereby 
avoid the costs of an otherwise unfriendly dissociation. When the conflicting partners 
fail to reconcile in consequence of blatant opportunism and dissolute the alliance, the 
stipulated protection covenants limit the potential loss of value. They serve as the fun-
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legal proceedings have to be started (Poppo and Zenger 2002; Das and Rahman 2002; 
Carson, Madhok and Wu 2006). 
Hypotheses 7: The negative relationship between knowledge-related dysfunc-
tions and the perceived alliance value will be weaker when formal protection is 
more intensive.  
2.6.4  Moderating effect of organizational protection on knowledge-related dysfunc-
tions 
Organizational protection mechanisms are effective when formal mechanisms fail to 
secure firms essential knowledge. The physical walling-off of knowledge-bearing re-
sources as well as the control of information flows by distinct rules or by gatekeeping 
persons effectively limits the partner’s knowledge acquisition even when he acts un-
fair. Ideally the acquired knowledge is useless since important pieces of the knowledge 
puzzle remain covered and secret. The partner then is unable to enhance the competi-
tive rivalry to the focal firm with its own knowledge. He has to stay within the alliance 
when he wants to accomplish his cooperative aims while the focal firm can hold its 
technological or knowledge-related edge and in turn can go for its own goals within 
the alliance (Hamel 1991). Construing this arguments within a value perspective the 
above described mechanisms constrain the losses and costs when dysfunctional inci-
dents occur, allow to create further value, and amend the focal firms position to appro-
priate its share of the value. 
Monitoring of the partners behavior and the collaborative development of the alliance 
is one of the key operational instruments to manage dysfunctional tendencies (Das and 
Rahman 2002). This task that is often performed by gatekeepers helps to detect and 
appraise dysfunctional symptoms (Das and Rahman 2002). The cognition of the dis-
turbing influences permits the focal firm to react. Once the firm has learned of the mis-
leading evolution it has the freedom of choice to choose and use adequate countermea-
sures to secure and gain the highest appropriable value. Depending on the specific 
situation the firm can elucidate misunderstandings, reduce the scope of the alliance, 
dissolute the cooperation, demand compensation, or do nothing (Dutta, Bergen and 
John 1994), when this approach improves the firms position or raises the attainable 















  H4 (-)
  H3 (-)
H2 (-)              
Hypotheses 8: The negative relationship between knowledge-related dysfunc-
tions and the perceived alliance value will be weaker when organizational pro-
tection is more intensive. 









3  Research Methods 
3.1  Research design and data collection 
We chose strategic alliances of young technology based enterprises with their actual or 
potential competitors in high- and key-technology industries since this empirical set-
ting satisfies our central requirements. Firstly, knowledge is a keystone in these alli-
ances because interorganizational learning and the symbiotic exchange and combina-
tion of firm specific knowledge bases are the pivotal reasons for these collaborative Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    28 
arrangements. Secondly, idiosyncratic knowledge is mostly YTBEs dominant asset. A 
dysfunctional exchange or unintended transfer of this asset may be aggravating but 
beside missed payments it doesn’t really hurt in a non-rivalrous relationship. By con-
trast, in an alliance between competitors these incidents may substantially erode firm’s 
competitive edge, diminish competitive advantages and threaten its economic devel-
opment and viability. Thirdly, the organizational setting is commonly less complex in 
strategic alliances of small and medium enterprises than of big enterprises. Therefore, 
dysfunctional incidents and protection measurements become clearly apparent and are 
not covered by other obfuscating influences.  
We tested our hypotheses in a double-key-informant approach with survey data gained 
in face-to-face interviews. Guided by theoretical considerations and field interviews 
we developed a survey questionnaire. In a first phase we held ten extensive semi-
structured interviews, each enduring between 60 and 165 minutes, with CEOs and alli-
ance or R&D managers that were well experienced in managing such alliances. These 
interviews confirmed that in such alliances the protection of valuable competencies 
and knowledge is a mayor management issue. In our field studies we also found strong 
evidence for the challenging managerial antagonism to hinder the occurrence of 
knowledge related dysfunctions and not to disturb value creation at the same time. On 
this fundament we developed a questionnaire which was then cross-checked by other 
academics that have a strong expertise in the field of empirical business relationship 
research. Afterwards we pretested the questionnaire for instrument validity with seven 
CEOs in YTBEs of different high technology industries to ensure its applicability in 
varying environments. Their feedback helped us to identify any revealed ambiguities 
in terms, concepts or issues and led to some minor changes of wording.  
We compiled a list of approximately 2750 enterprises that develop and apply nano- 
and microsystem technology, biotechnology, information and communication tech-
nologies, renewable energy-technologies, chemistry and process engineering and ad-
vanced automation engineering in different industrial sectors. In an internet based pre-
liminary screening we winnowed companies that didn’t match our criteria in terms of 
their underlying technology focus, age and organizational independency. Whenever it 
was procurable we identified CEOs, business development or R&D-directors as poten-
tial respondents namely before we contacted them by phone. During an initial call we 
explicated the research project and identified the most knowledgeable informant to 
minimize the key informant bias (Kumar and Stern 1993). We ensured that the partner Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    29 
was in charge for at least some of the company’s strategic alliances. We also checked 
for the technological focus, age, and the organizational independency to secure the 
companies’ fit to our criteria. When the interlocutors consented to interviews at their 
companies’ place of business we provided them with additional information and re-
ferred to the German Research Foundations project support to emphasize our trustwor-
thiness. 
We collected data from two key informants in each queried company as dependable 
sources of reliable and valid information (Campbell 1955; Kumar and Stern 1993; 
John and Reve 1982). This approach minimizes common method bias concerns 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003) that occur when dependent and independent variables are 
measured by the same source (Bagozzi, Yi and Phillips 1991). To meet the Campbell-
Fiske (Bagozzi, Yi and Phillips 1991) criterion we selected carefully one respondent of 
the top management level who was in charge for the underlying strategic alliance and 
one respondent who was accountable and involved in the operational management 
(Phillips 1981) and interviewed them separately (Podsakoff et al. 2003). The top-level 
managers were questioned about the strategic embeddedness and the configurative 
arrangement of the alliance, alliance goals and alliance outcomes and also provided 
information about the dyadic interorganizational rivalry, aspects of relational quality, 
organizational and financial linkages and industry specifics. To operations-level man-
agers, which are normally extreme apparent of alliance activities on a day-to-day basis 
(Baughn and Stevens 1997), we addressed questions about the concrete interorganiza-
tional coordination, occurring knowledge related dysfunctions and the corresponding 
formal and organizational protecting countermeasures. While the appropriateness and 
reliability of the first respondents’ answers were secured by their roles and responsi-
bilities we checked for the second respondents’ functions within the companies and the 
focal strategic alliances. We additionally cross-checked if the affiliations with their 
companies were consistent with alliance-life-times. Additionally we followed up by 
phone when the described facts or circumstances seemed to be non-distinctive, values 
were missing or data promised remarkable evidences. 207 of the 883 contacted com-
panies participated in the survey. This is equal to a response rate of 23.4 % for the ba-
sic sample. 57.0 % (118) of these YTBEs agreed on interviews with two respondents. 
We dropped another seven cases since they did not match our requirements concerning 
the quality of data or key informants. The remaining qualified set of 111 YTBEs cor-
respondents to a total response quote of 12.6 % (see Table 1). Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    30 
Table 1: Response 
RESPONSE 
Contacted Firms  883    1st key informant  207  (23.4%) 
Selected Firms  N = 111  (12.6 %)  2nd key informant  118  (57.0%) 
 
3.2  Measurement 
3.2.1  Dependent variable  
The perceived alliance value measures the overall performance of the strategic alliances. It 
addresses the advantages and disadvantages and captures the trade off between all the benefits 
and efforts of the specific strategic alliance for the focal firm (Ulaga and Eggert 2006). We 
wanted to integrate the shadow side of cooperative performance effects into the performance 
measure since our independent variables can induce positive as well as negative impulses. We 
adapted and extended the measure of Blankenburg Holm et al. (1999) and used their value-
based holistic perspective to overcome the limitations of more focused approaches like the 
achievement of financial or technological goals. The perceived value implicitly encompasses 
these measurement approaches and moreover ascertains the firm’s success in the underlying 
alliance (Madhok and Tallman 1998) as subjectively perceived by the management. Relying 
on manager evaluation of alliance success is appropriate when, like in our study, respondents 
represent top management (Olk 2002). Like the other scales it was measured with a seven-
point Likert scale (1 = very low; 7 = very high).  The measure is reliable at a Cronbach’s al-
pha of 0.86. An overview of our items is located in the Appendix. 
3.2.2  Independent variables 
Our conceptual approach of the used independent variables reflects the notion that “in 
many cases, indicators could be viewed as causing rather than being caused by the la-
tent variable measured by the indicators” (MacCallum and Browne 1993). Following 
these measurement perspective (e.g. Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001; Jarvis et 
al. 2003) we attended the guideline provided by Diamantopoulos et al. (2001) and 
constructed indexes based on formative indicators. All the items were measured with a 
seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) unless it is specifi-Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    31 
cally indicated otherwise. We adopted well established indicators whenever they were 
available. Additional indicators were developed following Rossiter’s C-OAR-SE-
procedure (Rossiter 2002). The measurement items are reported in the appendix. 
3.2.3  Alliance coordination 
Diamantopoulos et al. (2001) line out that specifying the construct domain by provid-
ing a conceptual definition of the construct has to be the first step of index construc-
tion. According to existing literature the management of strategic alliances addresses 
the coordination of joint task fulfillment (e.g. Gulati and Singh 1998; White and Siu-
Yun Lui 2005) as well as the coordination of the underlying relationship (e.g. Dyer 
1997; Ring and van de Ven 1994). The scope of the coordination construct captures 
the underlying nine activities that pertain to these conceptual aims: Aligning alliance 
activities (Hughes and Weiss 2007; Ancona and Caldwell 1992) on an (1) intraorgani-
sational and (2) interorganizational level; (3) monitoring if sub-goals are achieved 
(Ancona and Caldwell 1992) and the compliance of bidirectional agreements (Ancona 
and Caldwell 1992); (5) compromising (e.g. Mohr and Spekman 1994; Lin and Ger-
main 1998; Kale, Singh and Perlmutter 2000; Ancona and Caldwell 1992); (6) infor-
mational connectedness to top-level-management (Ancona and Caldwell 1992); (7) 
appropriate internal and external informational portrayal (Ancona and Caldwell 1992); 
(8) development of personal relationships (Ring and van de Ven 1994) and (9) estab-
lishing face-to-face contact across (Dyer 1997) the interorganizational boundaries. 
3.2.4  Knowledge-related dysfunctions 
Our construct covering the dysfunctional syndromes asymmetric learning pace (Hamel 
1991; Khanna, Gulati and Nohria 1998), unwanted transfer of knowledge, skills and 
competencies (Bresser 1988; Hamel 1991), and premature closing of the cooperation 
(Khanna, Gulati and Nohria 1998) is spanned by eight indicators: (1) withholding of 
knowledge (Hamel 1991; Khanna, Gulati and Nohria 1998); (2) premature termination 
of the alliance (Khanna, Gulati and Nohria 1998); (3) renegotiation of terms (Khanna, 
Gulati and Nohria 1998); loss of (4) technological, (5) marketing and (6) production 
knowledge (Hamel 1991; Norman 2004); (7) progressive informational retention 
(Hamel 1991); and (8) unidirectional closing of the interorganizational membrane 
(Khanna, Gulati and Nohria 1998). Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    32 
3.2.5  Knowledge protection 
We outlined the conceptual distinction between formal and organizational knowledge 
protection in a previous section. The dissimilitude of these both protection measures 
becomes more apparent in the light of the respective indicators that shape the con-
structs. The constructs seize on suggestions made by Norman (2001) and Porter Liebe-
skind (1996; 1997). 
Formal Knowledge Protection: Formal knowledge protection is constituted by six fac-
ets that describe alliance management activities concerning (1) the contractual claim-
ing of intellectual property, (2) the exclusion of unshareable information and data, and, 
the specification of (3) non-disclosure agreements, (4) contractual penalties, (5) anti-
enticement clauses, and (6) acquired respectively applied intellectual property rights. 
Organizational Knowledge Protection: Organizational knowledge protection is cov-
ered by alliance management activities that ensure (1) the provision of resources 
needed to protect the focal firm’s knowledge, and (2) the accountability of appointed 
persons for protection measures, or control (3) the interorganizational information 
flow, as well as the access to (4) information and data, (5) rooms and facilities, and (6) 
the relevant staff. 
3.2.6  Collinearity and validity 
Indicator collinearity is an issue under formative measurement, since the stability of 
the indicator coefficients is affected by the sample size and strength of the indicator 
intercorrelations (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). Excessive collinearity 
would complicate the separation of the distinct influences of the individual indicators. 
First, this would aggravate the assessment of indicators’ validity. Second, almost per-
fect linear combinations of indicators are likely to contain redundant information and 
therefore their exclusion of the index could be indicated (Bollen and Lennox 1991; 
Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). The variance inflation factors (VIF) appraises 
the possible presence of collinearity of each indicator. The VIFs of all used indicators 
are less then 4.8 (see Apendix). Within the single constructs the VIFs did not exceed 
above 3.3. This indicates for negligible multicollinearity concerns since most research-
ers consider VIFs up to 10 as acceptable (Chatterjee and Hadi 2006; Chatterjee and 
Price 1977).  Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    33 
Table 2: Criterion validity of formative constructs 
  Standardized parameter estimate 













Path  0.49  - 0.64  0.36  - 0.34 
t-value 
[one-tailed(two-tailed)] 
2.06** (*)  - 2.88*** (**)  2.20** (*)  - 2.08 * (*) 
Measures of fit        
χ
2 (df, p) [p  > 0.05]  34.65 (29, 0.22)  23.94 (16, 0.09)  46.20 (29, 0.02)  22.70 (12, 0.03) 
CFI [> 0.9]  0.99  0.99  0.97  0.96 
GFI [> 0.9]  0.95  0.96  0.93  0.96 
AGFI [> 0.8]  0.86  0.84  0.80  0.84 
RMSEA [< 0.08]  0.04  0.07  0.07  0.09 
t p < 0.10;  * p <  0.05; ** p < 0.025, *** p < 0.001 
 
The formative constructs should correlate with other theoretically associated con-
structs to provide evidence of external validity (Bagozzi 1994). Consistent with the 
alliance literature we relate coordination to satisfaction (Mohr and Spekman 1994), 
dysfunctions to trust (Parkhe 1998; Delerue-Vidot 2006), formal protection again to 
satisfaction (Ring 2002), and organizational protection to communication (Porter Lie-
beskind 1996). The resulting statistics confirm the external validity of the tested con-
structs. The coefficients are significant and indicate the correct direction (see Table 2: 
coordination  γ = 0.49,  dysfunction  γ = - 0.64,  formal  protection  γ = 0.36,  organiza-
tional protection γ = - 0.34). The fit indices CFI and GFI are above 0.9, AGFI above 
0.8 for all models. RMSEA is below 0.08 for three of the four models and 0.09 for the 
model that references to organizational protection, but RMSEA can be misleading 
when the degrees of freedom are small and sample size is not large (Chen et al. 2008). 
Overall, the external validity of our constructs is supported by the statistics. 
3.2.7  Control variables 
We controlled for several variables that were identified as relevant by prior research. Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    34 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tion may raise the tension between the 
partners, accelerate conflicts escalation and 
influence the severeness of knowledge 
transfer (Hamel 1991; Park and Russo 1996; 
Dussauge, Garrette and Mitchell 2000; Park 
and Ungson 2001). Thereby alliance 
benefits may erode. Since our sample 
consists of strategic alliances between 
competing firms we controlled for 
interorganizational  competition with a 
three-item-construct.  
Complexity of the Collaboration: We also 
controlled for the complexity of the alliance 
by integrating a variable that captured the 
number of the firm’s functional divisions 
involved in the collaboration. Complexity 
enhances management efforts (i.e. coordina-
tion costs) (Park and Ungson 2001) and fa-
cilitates an alliance-based targeted skim-
ming of relevant partner knowledge (Hamel 
1991). 
Shareholding: Scholars have shown that 
equity agreements between the partners af-
fect the alliance outcome. The functioning 
of equity and nonequity alliances is influ-
enced by different underlying governance 
properties (e.g. Gulati and Singh 1998; 
Oxley 1997; Pisano 1989; Zollo, Reuer and 
Singh 2002). Equity arrangements are par-
ticularly effective at aligning partner incen-
tives. Hence they foster greater interfirm 
knowledge transfers than contractual ar-Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    35 
rangements (Kogut 1988; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman 1996). A nominal variable 
indicated whether or not the alliance encompasses an equity agreement. 
4  Analysis and results 
The Pearson correlation matrix and some descriptive statistics for all variables are dis-
played in Table 3. The correlation coefficients in column 1 suggest that coordination is 
positively correlated while knowledge-related dysfunctions are negatively correlated 
with the perceived alliance value. Compared to this the both protection variables seem 
to be not correlated with the performance measure.  
Following Aiken et al. (1991) we conducted a hierarchical and moderated regression 
analysis to test the main and moderating effects of the dysfunctions and the firms co-
ordinating and protection activities on alliance value. We verified the variance infla-
tion factor (VIF) scores in all models to ensure the reliability of the analysis. VIF-
scores from 1.05 to 1.94 in the full model (see Table 4) indicate the absence of multi-
collinearity between the independent and control variables. The models testing hy-
pothesis 1 to 4 show the positive and significant effect of firm’s alliance coordination 
activities (ß = 0.369, p < 0.001 in the full model) and the negative and significant in-
fluence of knowledge-related dysfunctions (ß = −0.240, p < 0.01 in the full model) on 
the perceived alliance value. As expected coordination efforts foster while dysfunc-
tional phenomena dilute or preclude alliance success. These findings are stable and 
replicable over all tested models and give strong support to hypothesis 1 and 2. By 
contrary, the results of protection activities direct influences on the performance meas-
ure remain insignificant. There is no evidence for the assumed negative effects. As 
long as the direct influences are considered firms seemingly anticipate the potential 
detrimental impacts and find an ostensibly non-disturbing balance of protective and 
cooperative needs. These findings are likewise stable over all tested models and reject 
hypothesis 3 and 4.  
The moderating effects of the protection activities are also presented in Table 4. We 
applied Aiken and West’s (1991) procedure and centered the moderating variables 
around their mean to remove the inherent multicollinearity between interaction terms 
and the predictor variables they include. The interaction of the formal protection with 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Regression Results Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    37 
Figure 2: Plotting the Interactions 
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p < 0.001, full model) while the interaction of organizational protection activities on 
coordination induces a negative effect (ß = −0.277, p < 0.01, full model). The interac-
tion between dysfunctions and formal protection shows no significant influence on the 
alliance outcome. This implies that hypothesis 7 is not supported. Compared to this the 
slightly significant interaction between dysfunctions and organizational protection im-
pairs the alliance value (ß = −0.223, p < 0.1, full model). This suggests that hypothesis 
8 is not supported. 
We find evidence for the opposite: organizational protections activities can strengthen 
the negative association between dysfunctions and alliance success. These findings 
suggest that protection activities do not independently affect alliance success but do 
moderate the link between coordination activities and dysfunctions with the alliance 
performance. Additionally these results give a first evidence for the assumed differing 
effectivenesses of the both protection variables.  
We further validated the depicted moderating effects with a plot analysis. Therefore 
we plotted the slopes of the regression lines that show the relation of the moderated 
variable to the dependent variable (perceived alliance value) when the moderator 
changes from low (mean - 1 SD) to high (mean + 1 SD). The results reveal that the 
positive effect of coordination activities on the alliance success is much stronger when 
formal protection measures are intense (Figure 2, Cell 1). In contrary, intense organ-
izational protection activities weaken the promoting influences of coordination activi-
ties on the perceived alliance value (Figure 2, Cell 2). The converse directions of the 
both protection variables influences become apparent. Similarly, the negative link be-
tween knowledge-related dysfunctions and alliance outcome is amplified when organ-
izational protection activities are stronger (Figure 2, Cell 3). Especially when severe 
dysfunctions occur, substantial organizational protection may evidently derogate more 
than they benefit. These findings are consistent with the above statistics. Recapitula-
tory, the results of our analysis lends support to Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6. How-
ever, we found a reverse and significant effect for Hypothesis 8. 
5  Discussion 
The explanatory nature of this study requires a brief discussion of its main findings 
and contributions. We used learning alliances of YTBEs with their competitors as em-Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    39 
pirical setting to examine the link between knowledge-related dysfunctions, alliance 
coordination and knowledge protection activities with alliance success within a value 
approach. Alliance coordination activities lever the arrangements’ cooperative poten-
tial and strongly enhance the alliance value for the focal YTBE. Knowledge related 
dysfunctions show an antagonistic effect and let erode alliance value substantially. 
Formal as well as organizational protection activities are not directly linked to alliance 
success but enfold their influences within the interplay with dysfunctions and coordi-
nation activities. The joint effect between alliance coordination and formal protection 
activities forcefully drives alliance value. In contrast, intense organisational protection 
activities significantly lower the value stimulating influence of alliance coordination, 
whilst restrained organizational protection enables coordination to enfold its beneficial 
value creating potential. Formal protection activities, remarkably, do not moderate the 
detrimental relationship between knowledge-related dysfunctions and alliance per-
formance. However, high organizational protection activities amplify dysfunctions 
negative impact on alliance value whereas low organizational protection does not 
moderate this relation. 
Our study makes a number of contributions to strategic alliance management research. 
First, we enrich the growing body of strategic alliance literature that comprehends and 
researches alliances within a value perspective (Contractor and Lorange 1988a; Zajac 
and Olsen 1993; Dyer 1997;  Dyer, Singh and Kale 2008; Madhok 1997; Madhok and 
Tallman 1998; Anand and Khanna 2000; Sarkar, Echambadi and Harrison 2001; Kale, 
Dyer and Singh 2001; White and Siu-Yun Lui 2005; Das and Kumar 2007; Lavie 
2007;  Lavie 2009; Sarkar, Aulakh and Madhok 2009; Li, Zhou and Zajac 2009; 
Aggarwal and David H. Hsu 2009; Gulati, Lavie and Singh 2009). This approach theo-
retically allows integrating beneficial (e.g. achievement of alliance specific goals or 
financial success ratios) as well as disadvantageous (e.g. knowledge loss, alliance or 
alliance management specific costs and efforts) consequences and effects of complex 
issues. Some studies employed changing market or share values to catch alliances suc-
cess. But most previous studies concentrated either on alliances dark or bright sides 
and therefore used monodirectional value measures. Both methods are less suitable for 
research questions focusing on the effectiveness of alliance management concerns that 
may induce advantageous as well as disadvantageous outcomes. These situations re-
quire a comprehensive measure that allows capturing the potential trade-off in a com-
pensatory manner. Our study enriches the emerging progress of value-guided alliance Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    40 
research since, to the best of our knowledge, it is one of the few (e.g. Blankenburg 
Holm, Eriksson and Johanson 1999) that integrates both views in a encompassing alli-
ance value measure. Therefore it permits the holistic appraisal of alliance management 
activities and instruments.  
Second, our study further enhances the discussion on protection mechanisms for idio-
syncratic knowledge in strategic alliances (e.g. Hamel 1991; Larsson et al. 1998; Kale, 
Singh and Perlmutter 2000; Dussauge, Garrette and Mitchell 2000; Norman 2001, 
2002; Das and Rahman 2002; Mitchell, Dussauge and Garrette 2002; Reuer and Ariño 
2002; Ariño and Reuer 2004). We identified two definable protection mechanisms 
with predominant relevance in practical alliance management. Then we examined their 
interactions with knowledge-related dysfunctions and alliance coordination measures 
and tested their efficacy within the value perspective. Both mechanism neither increase 
nor decrease perceived alliance value directly. Apparently, focal firms at least do not 
overprotect palpable. This suggestion seems to be not unlikely since YTBEs normally 
experience a limiting lack of resource and management capacities.  
The diverging characteristics of the both protection mechanisms become obvious in 
the interaction analyses. They interact differently with alliance coordination as well as 
with knowledge related dysfunctions. The positive link between coordination and for-
mal protection sheds some light on research which emphasizes the relation-developing 
character of contractual negotiations (Ariño, de la Torre and Ring 2001, 2005) and 
lends further empirical foundation. On the contrary, intense organizational protection 
impairs alliance coordination effects while low protection measures do not induce a 
significant diminution. Moreover, modest organizational protection does not moderate 
dysfunctional influences, while high level activities aggravate the derogating impact. 
These findings suggest that overdrawing may be an issue. A careful implementation of 
organizational protection mechanism seems to be advisable, especially, because these 
indirect effects are not immediately visible. We got no empirical evidence for our sug-
gestion that formal protection would extenuate the value derogating impact of the dys-
functional phenomena. This results complements Deeds et al. (1999) who found no 
guarding relationship between contractual protection mechanisms and dysfunctional 
tendencies in R&D-alliances. All in all these findings are somehow disillusioning, 
since both of the most accepted and widely adopted protection measures against un-
regulated knowledge transfer seem to be inefficient. Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    41 
Third, this study also contributes to and stimulates research on alliance management 
capability (e.g. Kale, Dyer and Singh 2002; Kale and Singh 2009). This research 
stream explains “key outcomes in an alliance both at the dyadic and firm level” 
(Schreiner, Kale and Corsten 2009) with certain capabilities of alliance management. 
Actually most studies within this framework stress the ”positive link between alliance 
management capability and a fulfillment of various firm goals […] that enables a firm 
to realize and expand the value creation potential from that alliance” (Schreiner, Kale 
and Corsten 2009). The integration of a distinct protection capability should enhance 
this approach, especially when its fostering and disturbing potential we have shown 
above is considered under respect of alliance failure rates. 
Forth, our results draw some attention on the research stream on learning alliances 
with competitors (e.g. Hamel 1991). Due to our sample we expected ex-ante a strong 
influence of interorganizational competition between the partners on some of the con-
structs and their relationships within our models. Interestingly we found no evidence 
for this suggestion. This corresponds with many of the statements we got from the re-
spondents in our qualitative prestudy. We underline that alliance between competitors 
are everything else than trivial. But we have reason to believe, interorganizational 
competition between partners may be a little bit overrated by scholars. The growing 
number of these alliances indicates that practitioners may have found a way to deal 
with the specific requirements of these arrangements. 
5.1  Limitations 
The central aim of this study was to examine the complex effects and interdependen-
cies of alliance coordination and protection activities in strategic learning alliances. 
We understood the comprehension of this interwoven management tasks as a key to 
alliance success and the avoidance of alliance failure from the view of cooperating 
YTBEs. Therefore we did not address overall alliance performance and neglected the 
partners’ perspectives. This limitation is owed to the sensibility of the requested data. 
Many firms that gave us an openly response neither allowed us to contact their part-
ners nor disclosed their identities. This is regrettable especially since some of our re-
spondents declared freely that they themselves behaved sometimes intentionally dys-
functional. Another limitation lies in the studies single-country-design and its lack of 
longitudinal results. Although we gathered data from two points in time of each alli-
ance conclusions on the dynamic evolution of the alliances are constrained. Ideally a Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    42 
longitudinal and cross-national setting would allow a larger sample and enhance the 
studies generalizability but seems to be a significant practical challenge. Finally this 
study is limited by its selection of some of the many variables out of the entirety of 
factors influencing alliance processes and success. By way of example it would be 
very interesting how relational aspects or third party influences would extend the pic-
ture. This opens the door for further research to explore these questions in greater de-
tail. 
5.2  Implications for business professionals  
Our findings offer some implications for business professionals. First of all, alliance 
coordination is the key for alliance success. Firms and alliances which align their in-
ternal and interorganizational activities to the stipulated goals, which monitors if these 
goals and milestone are achieved and agreements are kept, and also establish and co-
ordinate stable personal relationships across firms boundaries are much more success-
ful than those which don’t. Second, alliance partners should beware and be aware of 
dysfunctional tendencies and phenomena. They impair value creation and reduce the 
value of the alliance significantly. Note, that when the genie left the bottle there is only 
a poor chance to catch him again. The established protection mechanisms won’t do. So 
the issues about the protection of idiosyncratic knowledge have to be concerned before 
the operative collaboration starts. Third, therefore alliance managers are well-advised 
to use the ex-ante negotiations of these matters to check if the potential partner re-
spects firm’s knowledge and interests, and to build a common understanding about 
dealing with firms’ critical knowledge and intellectual property rights. Then they 
should write down contractual guidelines how sensible knowledge, information and 
data have to be handled and explicate red lines which are not to be exceeded. Espe-
cially when dysfunctional activities, processes or behaviors are not intended they then 
can be revised and adjusted. Forth, organizational protection mechanisms - like the 
walling-off of information, facilities and staff or the exceeding curtailing of informa-
tion flows - are best established on a modest level. A cautious proceeding sensibilizes 
the personnel, provides them with explicit and implicit behavioral rules and gives them 
certainty when they are dealing with this topic. 
Further on, focal firm’s reasonable protection measures may signalize the partner that 
on the one hand the value of idiosyncratic knowledge is understood and respect to this Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    43 
matter is expected. Coevally this may suggest that in return the partner’s knowledge 
related interests are respected as well. 
In conclusion, fifth, YTBE’s alliance managers should not concentrate solely on ful-
filling collaborative tasks and achieving alliance goals. They better keep the whole 
picture in mind, integrate protection concerns into their view, and consider the particu-
lar interdependencies between the certain management measures. Especially, when 
learning alliances are a strategic option, the development of a distinct knowledge pro-
tection capability seems to be advisable. Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances    44 
6  Appendix 
Questionnaire Items 
  Construct / Variable / Item  VIF   
a)  Alliance Coordination 
[1=very low; 7=very high / formative measurement model; Informant 2] 
  
1)  In the course of the co-operation it is checked regularly, whether the agreements between the 
partners are observed. 
2.12  
2)  The activities of the involved employees of all partners are aligned to the stipulated objec-
tives.   
1.96  
3)  The activities of the employees of all partners in the different functional ranges (e.g. R&D, 
sales, etc.) are aligned to the stipulated objectives of the co-operation.   
2.06  
4)  When different opinions between the involved employees and other actors of the alliance 
partners occur, compromises are regularly agreed. 
1.84  
5)  It is monitored, whether sub-goals of the co-operation are achieved.  2.24   
6)  The executive level of the alliance partners are regularly informed on the progress of coopera-
tion. 
1.52  
7)  The circulation of information is coordinated, to ensure an appropriate internal and external 
representation of the co-operation. 
1.95  
8)  We coordinate deliberately the development of personal relationships to employees of the 
partner. 
1.11  
9)  Employees, who are directly involved in the cooperation, work across the partners' interor-
ganisational boarders frequently with an immediate contact. 
1.18  
b)  Knowledge related Dysfunctions 
[1=very low; 7=very high / formative measurement model; Informant 2] 
  
1)  The partner has tried to withhold knowledge from us which was/has been necessary to achieve 
the agreed cooperation objectives of our enterprise. 
2.06  
2)  After the partner had achieved its objectives, he has finished the relationship, without we had 
reached our objectives in the agreed extent. 
2.89  
3)  After the partner had reached the partial objectives of the collaboration faster than we, he 
wanted to renegotiate the conditions of the cooperation to his advantage. 
2.68  
4)  We have lost valuable marketing and sales knowledge to this partner.  1.91   
5)  We have lost valuable technological knowledge to this partner.  2.57   
6)  We have lost valuable production knowledge to this partner.  2.89   
7)  In the course of the co-operation the partner has increasingly withhold relevant information.  3.03   
8)  In the course of the co-operation the partner has become increasingly closed.   2.67   
c)  Organizational Protection 
[1=very low; 7=very high / formative measurement model; Informant 2] 
  
1)  The flow of information between us and the partner is regulated clearly in every respect.  1.35   
2)  There are clear rules and instructions which information are not to be made accessible to the 
partner. 
1.67  
3)  The partner solely gets access to rooms in which he can gain experience of our special knowl-
edge only to the extent which is tolerated by us. 
1.53  
4)  We deny the partner access to our staff which are not directly involved  in the co-operation.  1.55   
5)  We provide all necessary resources for the protection of our core competencies.  1.68   
6)  The responsibility to co-ordinate the protection of our competencies in this partnership we 
have delegated to a distinct person. 
1.48  
  (continued overleaf) 




d) Formal  Protection 
[1=very low; 7=very high / formative measurement model; Informant 2] 
  
1)  In the agreements with the partner we have exactly stipulated the use of the cooperative out-
come (distribution, utilization, rights). 
2.21  
2)  In our agreements with the partner we have defined which information and data are our prop-
erty. 
3.21  
3)  In our agreements with this partner we have defined, which information and skills we want to 
share with each other. 
2.70  
4)  In our agreements with this partner we have defined, which information and skills we do not 
want to share with each other. 
1.40  
5)  We have stipulated comprehensive confidentiality obligations with the partner.  1.35   
6)  In our contracts with the partner we have particularized and comprehensively regulated sanc-
tions for contract violations.  
1.78  
7)  The knowledge that we have brought in this cooperation with this partner we have completely 
secured by patents and other protective rights. 
1.30  
8)  The enticement of our company’s employees by the partner we have widely excluded by 
contract. 
1.28  
e)  Perceived Alliance Value 
[1=very low; 7=very high / reflective measurement model; Informant 1] 
  
1)  Considering all advantages and expenditures associated with this cooperation: how would you 
assess the value of this relationship? 
  
1)  How do you assess the value of this relationship compared to other alternative relationship?     
2)  How highly do you rate the value of all achievements/benefits that are sourced by this part-
ner? 
  
3)  How do you assess the financial benefit of the cooperation with this partner?     
f) Competition 
[1=very low; 7=very high / formative measurement model; Informant 1] 
  
1)  We were in direct competition with this partner.     
2)  We considered the partner as a very strong actual competitor.     
3)  We considered the partner as a very strong potential competitor.    
g)  Complexity of the Collaboration 
[0=false; 1=true / formative measurement model; Informant 1] 
  
  The alliance with this partner is mainly categorized in this area:      
  1) R&D  2) Marketing  3) Sales  4) Production  5) Procurement  6) Other alliance aims     
h) Shareholding 
[1=very low; 7=very high / formative measurement model; Informant 1] 
  
1)  We were/are financially involved in the partner.     
2)  The partner was/is financially involved in our company.     
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